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By the numbers: who really benefits from Nashville’s zoning reforms? 

Article by Christopher Remke, AIA [ret]  July 7, 2025  6.25 minute read

This document is an examination of the Housing and Infrastructure implications in numbers — 83% of those in need receive nothing — an analytical companion to Part 1, Nashville’s Great Misdirection: Who Really Benefits from Nashville’s Zoning Reforms. 


The information used in the table below is sourced from Nashville's Housing and Infrastructure Study (H&I), the Unified Housing Strategy (UHS), the commuter rate provided by the Census Bureau, and confirmed by the Tennessee Department of Labor. The analysis reveals that the H&I Study chooses to avoid and possibly downplay (decided not to explain) several significant report findings from the report details.


The commuter rate is a critical, and often overlooked, factor in Nashville’s housing debate. The reality is that job creation in Davidson County does not translate into local residential demand for the entire new workforce. According to state and census data, nearly 56% of people who work in Davidson County commute from outside its borders. Crucially, this is a growing trend, up from approximately 53% a decade ago, meaning surrounding counties are absorbing an even larger share of Nashville's workforce over time. This dynamic creates a fundamental split in housing projections. A "jobs-based" forecast, like the one used for the UHS headline number, will always produce a very high "stress test" figure because it is tied to the county's full economic output. In contrast, a demographic forecast, which is based on the actual resident population, inherently accounts for these commuting patterns and results in a much lower, more realistic number.

Data Source

UHS Report (HR&A)

UHS Adjusted for Commuters (44% Capture Rate)

Aterio.io

UT Boyd Center

10-Year Population Growth

~175,000

175,000 * 0.44 = ~77,000

~58,100

~40,652

Projected Increase in Households (Calculation ÷ 2.05)

175,000 ÷ 2.05 = ~85,300

77,000 ÷ 2.05 = ~37,561

58,100 ÷ 2.05 = ~28,341

40,652 ÷ 2.05 = ~19,830

Final Homes Needed (Households + 7% Vacancy)

85,300 * 1.07 =~91,300

37,561 * 1.07 = ~40,190

28,341 * 1.07 = ~30,325

19,830 * 1.07 = ~21,218

The table above reveals a staggering gap of over 70,000 housing units between the city's "stress test" projection of 91,300 and the state's official demographic forecast of 21,218. However, the most telling figure for a realistic path forward is the UHS Adjusted for Commuters scenario. This projection of approximately 40,190 homes is critical because it quantifies the housing need that remains from the city's aggressive jobs forecast once the established reality of regional commuting is factored in.

From this more realistic demand figure, we can perform a final calculation to isolate the specific housing need for the "Missing Middle" segment—those households earning above 100% AMI.

Calculation of "Missing Middle" Housing Need

Adjusted 10-Year Housing Demand

Less: Implied Vacancy (7% of total)

Equals: Total Household Demand

Less: Subsidized Household Demand (Households ≤100% AMI)

Equals: Market-Rate Household Demand (>100% AMI)

Plus: 7% Vacancy for Market-Rate Units

Total Estimated "Missing Middle" Units Needed

Value

40,190

(2,813)

37,377

(22,512)

14,865

1,041

15,906

This refinement reveals the true scale of the need for the "Missing Middle" segment. After accounting for commuters and the needs of lower-income households, the remaining market-rate need is only 15,906 units over ten years. The overwhelming majority of Nashville's actual housing need is for households below the 100% AMI threshold, yet the city's production strategy remains fixated on this least burdened portion of the population.

The 91,000-household headline figure includes housing units that will not serve the majority of those most in need. Households earning below 100% AMI make up 83% of the targeted "crisis" population, the H&I Study claims to support, yet this detail is downplayed from the core production focus.


Filtering (downward)—the idea that new supply will trickle down into affordability—has instead become what economists call "upward filtering," better known to communities as gentrification. This outcome is documented in the UHS, which found that over the last fifteen years, Nashville's market has put "pressure on these moderately priced units to become more expensive, removing the primary source of housing for low and moderate-income households." Yet, the H&I movement continues to rely on the discredited assumption that the hyper-high-end focus will be reconciled through filtering—the idea that affordability will eventually trickle down through market turnover, despite consistent evidence that this process fails to reach lower-income households. Academic research has shown that, in the rare instances where filtering does occur, it can take up to fifty years or more for units to reach deeply affordable levels, rendering it an irrelevant solution to Nashville's crisis, both in terms of timeliness and practicality.

 

The public narrative often declares a housing crisis to justify emergency upzoning and the promotion of Missing Middle Housing. This narrative has gained traction nationally and is usually associated with the elimination of single-family zoning. Nashville’s Metro Council instructed its consultant to base its recommendations on the Missing Middle concept, a narrow framing that shapes the outcome. However, we must be cautious: crises often invite sweeping solutions, and too frequently, political trends override data and overshadow genuine community needs.


By contrast, the Unified Housing Strategy was not politically directed. It focused purposefully on the affordability crisis, drawing on a broad base of community members and housing experts. It concluded that prioritizing the Missing Middle approach would worsen displacement and recommended against making it the central strategy. Despite this, Metro has chosen to sideline the UHS as a guiding framework, selectively drawing from its recommendations when they align with pro-development zoning strategies. The broader thrust of the UHS—centered on preventing displacement and prioritizing affordability—has been largely ignored in favor of advancing Missing Middle policies; the UHS itself warns that new development in the county's "weakest housing markets" often "leads to loss of older and more moderately priced homes and the creation of new, more expensive housing that is priced out of reach of the typical long-term neighborhood residents" (upward filtering or gentrification).


Equity is promoted in the H&I Study through language that highlights underserved communities of color. However, the report provides no actual solutions for these communities. The very policies it promotes are likely to exacerbate their challenges. Most notably, the report obscures the fact that a large share of single-family neighborhoods in Nashville are historically Black or Hispanic. Upzoning those areas based on a national anti-single-family narrative misreads local conditions and risks displacing the very communities it claims to uplift.


With these issues acknowledged, what do the numbers tell us? A clearer picture emerges when we resist blending all categories of need into a single projection. By isolating and clarifying the data, we move from a sweeping 91,000-unit headline to a focused and much smaller 15,756-unit estimate for households above 100% AMI. This refinement is not only more realistic, but it reveals a vastly different outcome. The overwhelming majority of housing need lies below this threshold, yet the city's production strategy remains fixated on the least burdened segment of the population.


Of the adjusted 40,040 units Davidson County needs, the 15,756 units allocated for households above 100% AMI represent just 17% of the projected housing demand for workforce housing. However, this 17% figure is not evenly distributed or inclusive. It applies solely to the upper tier of what is considered workforce housing and excludes the overwhelming majority of residents who fall below 100% AMI.


In fact, 83% of the households identified as being in housing need—that is, the very definition of the crisis—are not served at all by the proposed production strategy. Worse still, Nashville’s development history suggests that a significant portion of the 15,756 units will go to households earning well above 200% AMI. Thus, even the 17% that is ostensibly being served is unlikely to benefit the target income band. This conclusion is powerfully supported by the UHS report itself, which shows that Nashville's most significant "rental housing gaps are among the lowest-income households earning 30% of the AMI or below."


This is not affordability trickling down. It is gentrification filtering up.


The H&I Study creates the appearance of a crisis that only Missing Middle zoning can solve. But the data does not support this. Nashville already has the capacity for more than 70,000 new housing units under existing zoning, even before factoring in the new allowances for housing in commercial zones in 2024. We do not lack zoning. We lack alignment.

Here is the reality:

Pro: The proposal offers a financial windfall for developers and high-income buyers.

Con: It displaces working families by eroding naturally affordable homes—a risk clearly documented in Metro’s own Unified Housing Strategy.

Rather than double down on supply-side reforms that benefit the top of the market, Nashville must pause and rethink. A credible housing strategy (UHS recommendation)  must begin by protecting the affordability we still have and target new development toward those most in need, rather than those already overserved by the market.

Christopher Remke, President, Save Our Nashville Neighborhoods, Inc. (SONN)
© 2025 Christopher Remke, AIA [ret] | @builttothink | All rights reserved.   

    
Permission is granted to Save Our Nashville Neighborhoods, Inc. to reproduce, distribute, and adapt this material for educational and advocacy purposes, with appropriate attribution. All other uses require written permission.

Visit www.sonninc.org to explore how Nashville's current approach to housing and zoning may be benefiting outside investors more than the longtime residents and working families who built our neighborhoods.


SONN offers a local perspective grounded in community voice. Rather than relying on broad, one-size-fits-all zoning reforms, SONN calls for focused, practical steps to preserve affordability and protect existing neighborhoods.


The website offers a neighborhood-level response to the city's Housing & Infrastructure Study, examining the data, claims, and the actual impact on residents.


If you care about what Nashville becomes — and who gets to live here — SONNinc.org is a good place to start.

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