The housing supply is there — the affordability is not
Article by Christopher Remke, AIA (ret) • 5.5 minute read
When permits multiply but homes for workers vanish
Nashville’s housing debate has turned into a numbers game. Big projections, big promises, and bigger development pipelines dominate the conversation. Yet behind the spreadsheets and zoning maps lies a much simpler truth: the supply is there — the affordability is not.
For fifteen years, the city has chased the idea that if we build enough market-rate housing, affordability will follow. That theory, once plausible, now collapses under its own data. The Unified Housing Strategy (UHS) and the Housing & Infrastructure Study (H&I) — the two cornerstone planning documents guiding Metro’s decisions — do not tell the same story. In fact, they reveal the gap at the center of Nashville’s housing crisis.
Nashville is still shell-shocked from a decade of runaway growth. The roads, schools, and storm drains tell the story better than any policy brief. People see it, feel it, and no longer buy the idea that “more growth will fix what growth broke.” Until Metro leaders face the reality that the problem is not a shortage of rooftops but a shortage of affordability and infrastructure, the public will keep tuning them out. Voters have learned the difference between building a city and just building on one, and they are done being told that the cure for congestion, displacement, and rising costs is simply to build more of the same.
Two studies, two realities
The UHS, completed in early 2025, set an ambitious goal: 91,288 new homes by 2034. That figure came from an aggressive population forecast, assuming 175,000 new residents in just fourteen years —a pace of growth (construction) that has never occurred in Davidson County’s modern history.
By contrast, the Housing & Infrastructure Study shifted focus away from affordability and toward physical capacity, zoning, infrastructure, and land availability. It does not address low-income housing at all. Its framework, serving households at 100% of Area Median Income (AMI) and above, effectively excludes the working poor and essential labor force from a major “zoning” (planning?) initiative, particularly regarding the proposed densification through rezoning and the need to heal historic racism by enabling density in locations like the The Nations and Weho, now some of the most expensive propertis in the city.
The real question is: what are the drivers? Are they grant incentives or internal process-management goals? We will likely never know, since City Council Members hold the authority for zoning and serve as its ultimate leaders. The Planning Commission, once an advisory body to the Council, has evolved into an advocate for a particular development philosophy, “The Missing Middle.” In my opinion, it was a pretty good idea until elected “planners” distorted (redefined) “the middle.” Historically, the Metro Planning Commission sought to mitigate the impacts of growth, not manufacture it.
The result is a policy paradox: one study admits affordability is the crisis, while the other designs growth policy as if affordability no longer matters.
What the data really shows
Our analysis of state and local datasets paints a very different picture of growth. Since 2020, Davidson County has added just 13,621 residents—about 3,200 people per year. The realistic long-term “engine” of growth is even lower, around 1,500 per year, once pandemic disruptions and the short-lived international migration surge are removed from the data. This establishes a normalized trend, as the statistical bump of approximately 9,000 represents a single, isolated year. That one-time influx effectively offset population losses during the same period. Importantly, this migration bump likely increased pressure on the workforce and low-income housing, further widening the affordability gap beyond what developer-driven, market-rate “solutions” like upzoning for density can or will address (i.e., The Housing and Infrastructure Study).
Yet the city continues to plan as if 12,500 new residents will arrive every year. That mismatch, between policy assumption and real trend, has produced the illusion of a housing shortage where one no longer exists.
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Vacancy rates in market-rate apartments are at 12%, a twenty-year high.
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For-sale housing inventory: 5.18 months of supply, the definition of balance.
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Average home price: $713,000, placing most homes far above the reach of teachers, nurses, police officers, and service workers.
These are not indicators of scarcity. They are the warning lights of imbalance, an oversupplied market at the top, and a vacuum of affordability below 50% AMI.
The graph that tells the truth
Each projection includes a 20,000-unit subsidized goal (from the UHS study). Only the aggressive forecast (UHS) calls for large-scale market-rate construction. Real-world growth suggests we may already be near balance.
The bar chart above compares three housing scenarios through 2034:
Projection Total Homes Needed Subsidized Units Market-Rate Need UHS (Aggressive) 91,288 20,000 +71,288 Boyd Center (Moderate) 32,184 20,000 +12,184 Observed Trend (Reality Checked) 13,366 20,000 –6,634 (Surplus) Note: This author believes the subsidized unit count is already too low.
When real data replaces inflated assumptions, the picture reverses. Instead of a deficit, the market shows a surplus of market-rate housing. The entire shortfall lies in low-income and subsidized units, and incentivized market-rate upzoning, unregulated for subsidized solutions, increases displacement. This worsens the affordability crisis.
The policy gap that matters most
Both studies were born from the same desire: to manage growth. But in execution, the city’s focus drifted.
A Nashville effort called the Unified Housing Strategy began with a mission to identify and address real housing needs across income levels. Somewhere along the way, that mission was repackaged into the Council’s campaign to boost market-rate supply, a convenient fit for the slogans, not the data. What began as a human needs study morphed into a growth program dressed as housing reform.
The Unified Housing Strategy quantified the need but exaggerated its scale. The Housing & Infrastructure Study focused on capacity and quietly erased affordability from the equation. And just because the reports say it, it does not make it true.
Recall the journey: it starts as a huge supply push promising cheap and abundant, then slides to affordable, and finally lands on attainable, each step a little further from reality. The result is a Missing Middle so well-branded it could sell the very crisis it created.
Together, they created a self-reinforcing cycle: zoning reform to chase growth projections that never materialized, while families earning less than 50 percent of AMI, the city’s essential workforce, fall through the cracks.
There is some progress to the Barnes Fund and other programs, but will those gains keep up with the losses created by density-driven displacement?
We are now planning for a population that may never come, while neglecting the one we already have.
The attainability diversion
In the midst of this confusion, a new term has entered the conversation: attainability. It sounds compassionate, but it often serves as a policy loophole, a rhetorical way to claim progress without serving those most in need.
“Attainable housing” generally refers to homes affordable to moderate-income earners (80 to 120 percent of Area Median Income), often above the wages of service workers, childcare providers, and retirees on fixed incomes.
When attainability replaces affordability, it shifts public sympathy upward, moving away from the working poor, and redefines success in terms of who can buy a townhouse rather than who can keep a home. True equity demands that we confront this semantic drift before it hardens into permanent policy.
A bottom-up revolution
The next chapter of Nashville’s housing policy must flip the logic.
Instead of “build more, hope it trickles down,” we should start with the people who actually live and work here. Protect existing Naturally Occurring Affordable Housing (NOAH), focus on building solutions for the 20,000 subsidized homes already identified, and prioritize these as the first line items —not afterthoughts or following an aggressive Metro Council-driven developer land grab for luxury homes and condos, while those most in need remain in crisis.
The crisis is not due to a lack of units. It is the lack of affordable units for ordinary people.
Nashville’s data tell a different story from the one being sold at City Hall. The city will not heal from its growth aftershock, “its civic PTSD,” until it stops confusing market expansion with public service and reckons with the toll of a decade of record growth. Trust will return when leaders stop selling slogans and start repairing what they broke. Until then, voters are not buying the spin.